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1.	Introduction		Apparently,	Stanislaw	Ulam,		the	mathematican	and	physicist,	who	invented	the	Monte	Carlo	method,	once	said	that	every	action	should	have	at	least	two	motivations.	Ontic	structural	realism	(OSR)	certainly	meets	that	criterion.	The	first	motivation	is	one	it	has	in	common	with	the	so-called	‘epistemic’	form	(Worrall	1989),	namely	that	of	offering	a	response	to	the	ontological	changes	apparently	manifested	throughout	the	history	of	science,	as	represented	by	the	infamous	‘Pessimistic	Meta-Induction’.	This	response	was	been	traced	back	by	Worrall	(ibid.)	to	Poincaré	and	is	embodied	in	the	emphasis	on	the	relevant	equations	as	representing	the	structure	that	underlines	such	changes.	Crucially,	however,	despite	suggestive	remarks,	Worrall	did	not	extend	his	considerations	into	the	quantum	domain.		 The	second	motivation	begins	there,	or	in	modern	physics	more	generally	and	seeks	a	form	of	realism	‘fit	for	purpose’	in	this	domain.	The	progenitors	of	this	strand	of	the	structuralist	project	are	Cassirer	and	Eddington	who	recognised	the	implications	of	quantum	physics	for	the	traditional	object-oriented	metaphysics	and	highlighted	the	significant	role	of	certain	‘higher	principles’	and	symmetries	in	modern	physics.	There	are,	of	course,	crucial	differences	with	the	current	structuralist	iteration:	first	of	all,	and	most	obviously,	Cassirer	and	Eddington	were	definitely	not	realists!	Secondly,	following	Born	and	Heisenberg,	they	took	the	implications	of	the	newly	articulated	quantum	statistics	to	be	that	particles	could	no	longer	be	regarded	as	individuals	and	hence	argued	on	those	grounds	that	an	object-oriented	stance	must	be	dropped	in	favour	of	a	structuralist	one.	As	is	now	well	known,	the	relevant	physics	does	not	in	fact	preclude	regarding	quantum	particles	as	individuals	(French	and	Krause	2006),	and	so	a	form	of	metaphysical	underdetermination	is	generated	with	regard	to	the	‘individuality	profile’	of	the	particles	(see	Brading	and	Skiles	2012;	for	an	overview	see	French	forthcominga).	van	Fraassen	(1991)	presents	this	as	a	challenge	to	the	realist:	how	can	she	maintain	her	ontological	commitments	to	such	particles	when	she	cannot	even	say	whether	they	are	individuals	or	not	(at	least,	on	the	basis	of	the	physics)?	The	response	of	the	ontic	structural	realist	is	to	urge	a	shift	in	those	commitments,	away	from	a	view	of	the	particles	as	objects	and	towards	the	underlying	structure.	
 Both	of	the	above	motivations	feature	in	Ladyman’s	classic	paper	(Ladyman	1998)	setting	out	both	the	basis	of	OSR	and	its	extension	to	quantum	theory.1	Of	course,	one	can	always	ask	the	question:	what	if	they	were	to	cleave	apart	(see	French	2006)?		One	might,	for	example,	worry	that	the	structural	
continuity	emphasised	by	Worrall	and	exemplified	by	the	history	of	our	understanding	of	light	in	classical	terms,	to	use	his	example,	cannot	be	maintained	through	the	classical-quantum	transition.	One	option,	in	that	case,	would	be	to	argue	that	this	transition	is	perhaps	not	as	sharp	or	dramatic	as	is	often	portrayed	and	that	a	form	of	continuity	can	still	be	maintained,	albeit	in	somewhat	different	form	than	that	set	out	by	Worrall.	In	particular,	given	the	second	motivation	above,	and	the	significance	of	symmetries,	as	captured	in	group-theoretic	terms,	in	quantum	physics,	any	proposed	continuity	should	accommodate	the	latter.	Thus	Thébault	has	argued	that	‘…we	can	isolate	the	structures	that	both	connect	and	generalize	the	relationships	between	the	various	classical	and	quantum	formal	structures’	(2016,	p.	90)	and	offers	a	structural	framework	cashed	out	in	terms	of	the	combination	of	a	state	space	with	Poisson	bracket	structure	and	a	set	of	observables	with	Lie	algebra	structure.	Crucially,	this	framework	is	explicitly	dynamical	and	in	a	paper	that	significantly	foreshadows	certain	features	of	OSR,	Saunders	(1993)	took	the	likes	of	Laudan	and	Kuhn	to	task	for	failing	to	pay	sufficient	attention	to	the	continuities	inherent	in	the	relevant	dynamics.	If	we	properly	address	the	latter,	he	maintained,	we	cannot	help	but	notice	the	importance	of	the	Hamiltonian	formulation	and	Fourier	decomposition	for	Heisenberg,	or	that	of	Poisson	brackets	(again)	for	Dirac,	to	give	just	a	couple	of	examples.	Of	course	there	are	differences	between	the	classical	and	quantum	forms	of	these	devices	–	else	how	would	there	be	any	theoretical	advance	?!	–	and	so	Saunders	coined	the	resonant	phrase	‘heuristic	plasticity’	to	capture	the	way	they	are	applied,	albeit	in	modified	form.	In	a	sense,	then,	the	extent	to	which	one	will	accept	there	is	appropriate	continuity	between	the	theories	depends	on	just	how	‘plastic’	one	takes	these	devices	to	be.		 The	alternative	would	be	to	simply	bite	the	bullet	and	abandon	the	attempt	to	offer	a	response	to	the	purported	problem	of	ontological	change	in	favour	of	the	second	motivation.	One	might	support	such	a	move	by	appealing	to	recent	dismissals	of	the	Pessimistic	Meta-Induction	and	associated	attempts	to	construct	‘local’	forms	of	realism,	grounded	in	the	specific	features	of	particular	theories	(Saatsi	2017;	Vickers	2019).	Following	this	approach,	OSR	would	be	presented	as	a	form	of	realism	specifically	tailored	to	the	demands	of	quantum	physics,	say,	again	highlighting	the	significance	of	the	relevant	symmetries	for	this	theory.		 I’ll	come	back	to	the	issue	of	how	these	two	motivations	mesh,	or	not,	at	the	end	of	this	essay	but	in	either	case,	we	already	have	the	beginnings	of	an	answer	to	the	core	question	of	this	paper	–	what	is	structure?	It	is	given,	in	part,	by	the	combination	of	the	relevant	laws	and	symmetries.	I	say	‘in	part’	because	this	combination	yields	more	possibilities	than	are	actually	observed.	My	‘go	to	example’	here	is	that	of	Permutation	Invariance	(PI),	which,	of	course,	underpins	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination	regarding	the	individuality	of	quantum	particles.	PI	is	captured	in	mathematical	terms	by	the	permutation	group,	two	representations	of	which	are	the	symmetric	and	anti-symmetric,	corresponding	to	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	respectively.	In	this	formal	sense,	then,	the	two	most	fundamental	kinds	in	the	world	‘drop	out’	of	the	symmetry	under	permutations	of	quantum	particles.	Going	beyond	that	formal	sense	and	metaphysically	fleshing	out	that	sense	of	‘dropping	out’	remains	a	topic	for	further	discussion:	one	option	is	to	rummage	in	the	toolbox	of	
metaphysics	(French	and	McKenzie	2012	and	2015)	and	deploy	one	of	the	standard	notions	of	dependence	to	explicate	the	claim	that	the	kind	is	dependent	on	the	symmetry,	in	a	sense.	However,	McKenzie	(2014)	and	Wolff	(2012)	have	argued	that	standard	forms	of	this	particular	‘tool’	aren’t	up	to	the	job.	As	an	alternative,	the	notion	of	a	determinable	and	its	associated	determinates	have	been	suggested	as	offering	a	means	for	metaphysically	capturing	the	relevant	relationship.	Again,	I	shall	come	back	to	this.			 Now	of	course,	as	is	also	well	known,	other	forms	of	particle	statistics	beyond	those	corresponding	to	the	bosonic	and	fermionic	kinds	are	also	possible:	once	we	move	beyond	permutations	in	situations	involving	only	two	particles	and	consider	three	or	more,	a	whole	slew	of	other	representations	become	available,	corresponding	to	so-called	parastatistics.	It	would	be	too	quick	to	dismiss	these	other	representations	as	mere	‘surplus’	mathematical	structure,	not	least	because	of	their	potential	to	be	applied	to	concrete	physical	situations:	indeed,	one	such	paraparticle	representation	was	presented	as	a	possible	resolution	of	the	quark	statistics	problem	in	the	mid-60s,	only	to	be	abandoned	in	favour	of	what	was	to	become	quantum	chromodynamics	(French	1995).	Nevertheless,	as	things	stand,	the	combination	of	laws	and	symmetries	gives	us	more	than	we	currently	need.	Hence,	if	we	are	going	to	set	out	what	is	the	structure	of	the	world,	in	the	sense	of	this	world,	we	need	to	acknowledge	that	only	certain	of	the	possibilities	inherent	in	the	framework	are	actualised.	Thus,	following	Cassirer,	this	world-structure	should	be	portrayed	as	a	combination	of	laws,	symmetries	and	specific	observed	outcomes,	such	as	the	bosonic	and	fermionic	kinds,	which	can	be	characterised	as	‘existential	witnesses’	(Wilson	2012),	in	the	sense	that	they	pick	out	this	world	as	the	actual	one	among	the	various	possible	worlds.	Yet	again,	I	shall	return	to	this	later	in	the	essay.			 In	specifying	what	is	structure,	something	also	needs	to	be	said	about	how	these	features	are	inter-related.	Consider	the	laws	and	symmetries:	should	the	latter	be	taken	as	‘meta-laws’	that	constrain	the	former?	Cassirer,	again,	offered	an	alternative	to	such	a	straightforwardly	hierarchical	view,	arguing	that	laws	and	symmetries	should	be	understood	as	mutually	conditioning	one	another,	yielding	a	kind	of	‘Parmenidean	whole’	(for	further	discussion,	again	see	French	2014).	That	still	leaves	the	relationship	between	laws/symmetries	and	specific	measurement	outcomes.	Granted	that	the	relationship	between	Permutation	Invariance	and	bosonic	and	fermionic	kinds	might	be	captured	in	terms	of	determinables	and	determinates,	as	mentioned	above,	some	have	argued	that	in	order	to	account	for	specific	measurement	results,	structural	realists	need	to	take	a	stance	on	the	measurement	problem	in	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	(Esfeld	2015).	The	demand	seems	to	be	for	a	specifically	structuralist	solution	but	it	is	not	at	all	clear	what	form	that	might	take.	Here	we	bump	up	against	another	form	of	underdetermination,	namely	that	of	the	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	itself	(French	and	Saatsi	2020):	if	one	is	an	adherent	of	the	‘consciousness-causes-collapse’	or	GRW	views,	then,	putting	things	simply,	the	wave	function	encodes	certain	potential	outcomes	that	are	actualised	through	the	action	of	either	consciousness	or	a	kind	of	probability	field,	respectively;	or	if	one	is	an	Everettian,	of	course,	it	represents	different	branches	of	the	multiverse,	in	each	of	which	definite	outcomes	are	actualised.	The	latter,	with	its	further	elaboration	in	terms	of	the	world	‘emerging’	as	a	kind	of	‘pattern’	might	seem	particularly	suited	to	a	structuralist	stance.	However,	
given	what	I	shall	say	below	about	the	modal	nature	of	structure	(at	least	on	certain	accounts),	we	might	also	look	to	a	recent	revival	of	the	modal	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	that	takes	observables	rather	than	states	to	have	ontological	priority,	with	the	Hamiltonian,	incorporating	its	own	symmetries,	defining	that	subset	of	observables	which	acquires	definite	actual	values	(Lombardi	2019).	From	this	perspective,	the	process	of	measurement	comes	to	be	seen	as	one	of	symmetry	breaking	(ibid.,	p.	38)	and	articulated	as	it	is	in	terms	of	a	symmetry	based	conception	of	particle	kinds	on	the	one	hand	and	a	metaphysics	of	property	‘bundles’	on	the	other	(again,	I’ll	come	back	to	this),	this	seems	to	offer	some	hope	of	naturally	meshing	with	OSR	in	general.2		 		 Thus	the	ontic	structural	realist	should	perhaps	hold	off	on	acceding	to	the	above	demand	for	a	‘solution’	and	instead	note	that	a	variety	of	stances	towards	the	measurement	problem	are	possible,	depending	on	whether	one	can	give	structuralist	renderings	of	the	different	interpretations	of	quantum	theory.	Indeed,	the	extent	to	which	one	can	give	such	a	rendering	and	thereby	tie	a	given	interpretation	into	the	broader	structuralist	picture	might	be	adduced	as	a	way	of	breaking	the	underdetermination.	These	are	issues	for	another	time.	I	noted	above	that	with	this	picture	we	have	the	beginnings	of	an	answer	to	the	question	‘what	is	structure?’	and	one	might	wonder	what	more	is	being	asked	for.	It	is	to	that	issue	that	I’ll	now	turn.		
2.	What	is	Structure?	When	I	first	started	presenting	seminars	and	talks	on	OSR,	way	back	in	the	day,	this	was	the	most	commonly	asked	question3	and	the	temptation	was	simply	to	scribble	the	following	on	a	whiteboard		 [P,	H]	=	0		and	declaim	‘It’s	that!	That’s	the	structure	I’m	talking	about!!’	And	what	that	is,	of	course,	is	a	representation	of	the	afore-mentioned	conditioning	role	of	PI,	represented	by	the	requirement	that	the	Hamiltonian	must	commute	with	the	permutation	operator.	Understood	one	way,	as	indicated	above,	invariance	under	permutations	has	been	taken	to	yield	a	metaphysics	of	non-individual	particles;	understood	another	way,	it	divides	up	Hilbert	space	in	such	a	way	that	these	particles	can	still	be	interpreted	as	individuals	but	subject	to	accessibility	constraints	(see	French	1989).	Both	understandings	presume	an	object-oriented	stance	–	drop	that	and	take	the	above	as	representing	a	feature	of	the	structure	of	the	world	and	you	have	the	core	of	OSR	(or	so	I	claim!).			 Not	surprisingly	perhaps,	simply	pointing	to	the	above	commutation	relation	did	not	seem	to	satisfy	the	audiences	at	the	time.	Some	took	this	as	painting	OSR	as	a	form	of	Platonism	in	taking	the	structure	of	the	world	to	be	mathematical	(see,	for	example,	Cao	2003;	and	for	a	response,	French	and	Ladyman	2003).	Granted	the	difficulty	in	clearly	delineating	mathematical	structure	from	physical	structure,	particularly	given	concerns	about	how	to	accommodate	causality	in	the	quantum	domain	(see	French	2014	Ch.	8),	the	commitment	is	to	the	latter,	rather	than	the	former.	What	more	is	then	being	asked	for	by	our	central	question?		 Here	a	note	of	frustration	creeps	in	from	the	ontic	structural	realist’s	side.	Consider	the	notion	of	‘object’,	implicitly	appealed	to	by	most	non-structural	
realists:	there’s	a	certain	asymmetry	in	the	debate	whereby	structural	realists	are	(constantly)	asked	‘what	is	structure?’	but	their	non-structural	friends	and	colleagues	are	almost	never	required	to	give	an	answer	to	the	corresponding	question	‘what	is	an	object?’.	And	of	course	it	is	not	as	if	the	answer	to	the	latter	is	utterly	straightforward.	A	quick	glance	at	the	relevant	entry	in	that	crucial	resource,	The	Stanford	Encyclopaedia	of	Philosophy,	reveals	a	rich	and	multi-faceted	metaphysical	debate	(Rettler	and	Bailey	2017),	surveying	as	it	does	three	broad	questions	about	the	category	object:		What,	if	any,	is	its	contrast	or	complement?	What	is	its	extension?	What	is	its	nature?		If	we	just	take	the	first	and	the	obvious	contrast	with	properties,	we	are	presented	with	the	following	break-down:		–Objects	are	Subjects;	Properties	are	Predicates	–Objects	are	in	Space	and	Time;	Properties	are	Not	–Objects	are	Singly-Located;	Properties	May	Multiply	Locate	–Objects	are	Concrete;	Properties	are	Abstract	–Objects	don’t	obey	the	Identity	of	Indiscernibles;	Properties	do	–Objects	are	Sense-Perceptible;	Properties	are	Not	–Objects	are	Uninstantiated;	Properties	are	Instantiated		And	if	we	delve	deeper,	into	the	notion	of	instantiation	for	example,	further	questions	blossom:		•	is	instantiation	a	transitive	or	a	non-transitive	relation?	•	is	instantiation	a		symmetrical	or	a		non-symmetrical	relation?	•	is	instantiation		a		cross-categorial		relation?	•	is		instantiation		an	internal		or		an		external		relation?	•	is		instantiation		an		essential	or	an	accidental	relation?	•	is	instantiation	a	necessary	or	a	contingent	relation?	•	does	the	instantiation	relation	have	instances?	•	is		instantiation		a		universal		or		a		particular		relation?	(see	also	Cumpa	2018)			And	so	it	goes.	Perhaps,	when	it	comes	to	objects,	it	is	felt	that	the	corresponding	question	–	what	is	an	object?	–		doesn’t	need	to	be	asked	of	the	non-structural	realist	because	she	has	a	well-known	and	widely	acknowledged	range	of	metaphysical	options	that	she	can	appeal	to	if	pressed,	as	evidenced	by	the	above.	Perhaps,	then,	the	structural	realist	should	avail	herself	of	a	similar	set	of	metaphysical	tools	or	devices	that	she	can	deploy	in	response	to	our	question.			
3.	Rummaging	in	the	Toolbox	Let	us	take	a	leaf	out	of	the	Stanford	Encyclopaedia	entry	and	focus	on	the	contrast	with	properties.	Just	as	we	can	use	the	latter	as	a	foil	to	help	illuminate	the	metaphysics	of	objects,	so	we	can	do	the	same	when	it	comes	to	structure.	In	particular,	I	shall	focus	on	two	broad	sets	of	tools	from	our	metaphysical	toolbox:	
the	first	proceeds	from	the	bottom	up,	as	it	were,	and	has	to	do	with	fusion,	whereas	the	second	operates	from	the	top	down	and	concerns	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	already	touched	upon.	Within	that	latter	context	I	shall	also	explore	the	usefulness	of	a	third	tool,	involving	the	notion	of	potentiality,	in	when	it	comes	to	articulating	the	metaphysics	of	laws	and	symmetries	as	structural	features	.		
3.1	Tool1:	fusion	There	is	a	widely	held	view	that	there	exists	some	fundamental	level	at	which	our	description	of	the	world	terminates	and	that	this	level	is	populated	with	certain	‘basic	building	blocks’,	which	are	taken	to	have	some	form	of	ultimate	ontological	priority	over	other	features	of	reality,	that	are	then	arranged	in	some	kind	of	hierarchy	on	this	basis.	This	view	has	been	challenged	on	a	number	of	fronts.	Some	have	argued,	inductively,	that	we	should	expect	future	physics	to	be	like	that	of	the	past,	in	presenting	a	series	of	ever	deeper	levels	(Schaffer	2003).	In	response	it	has	been	suggested	that	such	arguments	rely	on	an	implicit	and	speculative	assumption	that	goes	beyond	the	kind	of	naturalistic	approach	to	metaphysics	that	focuses	on	our	current	best	theories	(McKenzie	2011,	p.	246).	Alternatively,	certain	features	of	current	physical	theories	have	been	appealed	to,	such	as	the	dualities	found	in	string	theory	and	QFT	and	the	‘effective’	field	theoretic	understanding	with	regard	to	the	latter,	in	order	to	undermine	the	above	framework	(McKenzie	2017).			 Concerns	have	also	been	raised	about	the	extent	to	which	the	‘basic	building	blocks’,	as	standardly	conceived,	can	explain	the	features	of	the	further	levels	in	the	hierarchy.	One	response	is	to	reconceive	these	‘blocks’	along	structuralist	lines	and	afford	symmetry	principles	and	laws,	for	example,	such	ontological	priority	(French	2014;	forthcomingb).	Of	course,	as	noted	above,	the	fundamental	level	cannot	only	be	populated	by	such	features,	given	the	way	they	encode	the	kinds	of	possibilities	represented	by	parastatistics,	for	example,	and	so	specificity	must	also	be	allowed	for	–	in	this	case	through	the	bosonic	and	fermionic	representations	of	the	permutation	group,	as	again	we’ve	already	noted.			 There	is,	however,	a	further	challenge	to	the	above	widely	held	view	that	should	be	considered.	Within	this	view,	these	‘basic	building	blocks’	are	typically	conceived	of	in	terms	of	substances	that	possess	or	instantiate	or	whatever		…	properties,	yielding	a	‘vertical’	form	of	categorical	priority	insofar	as	this	substance	+	properties	combination	is	taken	to	be	prior	to	objects	or	events	or	states	of	affairs	or	whatever.	However,	Paul	has	pointed	out	that	there	is	also	a	‘horizontal’	form	of	priority	in	that	substances	are	taken	to	be	prior	to	properties	(Paul	2013).	The	former,	as	just	stated,	possess	or	instantiate	the	latter,	or	as	Sider	has	put	it,	‘…	particulars,	not	properties,	wear	the	pants’	(Sider	2006,	pp.	389–90;	quoted	in	Paul	ibid.,	p.	94).	Substance,	as	Paul	notes,	is	taken	to	be	‘…	specially	suited	to	play	a	role	where	it	determines	the	most	ontologically	basic	nodes	of	the	structure	of	Reality.’	(Paul	2013,	p.	93).	And	it	plays	such	a	role	by	‘making	concrete’	or	instantiating	or	possessing,	in	some	sense,	properties.	Of	course,	you	might	well	wonder	how	exactly	substance	does	this.	The	originator	of	the	trope	theoretic	view	of	properties,	Williams,	as	quoted	by	Paul,	suggests	that	substance	‘…	engenders	concreteness	at	the	same	time	as	it	provides	particularity,	not	because	particularity	is	concreteness,	but	because	by	being	the	
occasion	for	predicates,	prime	matter	permits	that	concurrence	of	predicates	which	is	concreteness’	(Williams	1958,	p.	508),	which	is	not	all	that	helpful	really.			 At	this	point,	one	could	adopt	a	kind	of	Lockean	‘primitivist’	stance	and	acknowledge	that	not	only	can	we	not	say	what	substance	is,	since	by	‘being	the	occasion	for	predicates’	it	lies	beyond	them,	but	we	can’t	say	how	it	does	what	it	does.	Alternatively,	we	could	analyse	further	this	notion	of	‘being	the	occasion	of	predicates’,	running	the	risk	perhaps	of	regress.	Or	we	could	throw	our	hands	in	the	air	and	declare	substance	to	be	metaphysically	otiose.	This	is	more	or	less	Paul’s	reaction:			‘I	reject	the	notion	that	we	need	more	than	one	ontological	category	to	provide	the	ontological	structure	that	substantial	categorical	priority	was	traditionally	invoked	to	support.	In	effect,	the	idea	is	that	the	categorical	difference	between	substance	and	property	should	be	collapsed	at	the	fundamental	level,	since	we	can	use	purely	qualitative	entities—perhaps	relations	and	fusions	of	n-adic	properties—to	build	the	fundamental	external	and	internal	structure	of	Reality.’	(Paul	2013,	p.	109)		In	this	rejection	we	can	see	a	resonance	with	the	work	of	Cassirer	and	Eddington,	both	of	whom	advocated	a	shift	from	things-as-substances	to	relations	as	the	ground	of	objectivity	in	science	(French	2003;	French	2014	pp.	79-83	and	pp.	91-99).	For	them,	as	noted	already,	if	such	things-as-substances,	or	objects,	could	not	be	regarded	as	individuals,	according	to	quantum	mechanics,	then	they	should	be	dispensed	with.	Given	that	we	can	so	regard	them,	subject	to	certain	caveats,	the	argument	has	shifted,	as	also	indicated	above:	now	it's	the	ambiguity	regarding	whether	they	can	be	said	to	have	an	‘individuality	profile’	that	motivates	their	elimination.	But	of	course,	even	if	one	were	to	adopt	the	objects-as-individuals	horn	of	the	underdetermination,	one	might	still	prefer	not	to	accept	substance	into	one’s	metaphysical	pantheon,	adopting	instead,	say,	Muller’s	and	Saunders’	relations	based	approach	to	individuality	in	the	quantum	context	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008;	but	for	concerns,	see	Norton	2015).		 Paul’s	response	is	motivated	not	only	by	the	idea	that	we	don’t	need	substance	to	build	a	world,	as	it	were,	but	also	that	it	actually	creates	metaphysical	problems	where	none	need	exist.	Thus	she	invites	us	to	consider	recent	debates	over	the	nature	of	laws	(I’ll	come	back	to	this),	where,	she	argues,	the	implicit	categorical	bias	towards	substance	‘…	creates	the	need	for	an	explanation	of	what	the	underlying	causal	or	counterfactual	connections	are	between	the	parts	that	are	strung	together	to	give	the	overall	pattern	of	the	mosaic’	(2013	p.	102).	For	advocates	of	the	Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley	view	this	need	for	an	explanation	is	satisfied,	ultimately,	by	the	necessary	connections	existing	between	the	relevant	universals	and	one	can	then	account	for	the	supposed	governing	function	of	laws	in	these	terms;	for	dispositionalists,	it	is	the	powers	manifested	by	the	relevant	parts	of	the	mosaic	that	do	all	the	explanatory	work.			 However,	if	we	reject	substantial	categorical	priority,	as	Paul	argues,	there	is	simply	no	need	for	any	such	explanation	and	likewise	no	need	to	make	sense	of	the	supposed	governance	of	laws.	Instead,	‘[w]hat	makes	it	the	case	that	we	have	a	particular	linking	of	properties	and	relations	…	is	simply	the	existence	
of	the	fundamental	distributional	property	that,	in	effect,	is	the	pattern.’	(Paul	2013,	pp.	102-103).	As	she	says,	this	can	be	viewed	as	a	‘new	sort	of	Humeanism’,	in	that	‘[t]he	distributional	property	guides	the	pattern	…	across	locations	by	being	more	fundamental	than	that	pattern,	and	supports	counterfactual	and	causal	inferences	across	times	by	being	the	more	fundamental	thing	that	simply	exists	at	the	different	locations.’	(ibid.,	p.	103).			 As	I	said,	I’ll	come	back	to	this	issue	of	how	we	should	understand	laws	from	a	structuralist	perspective	shortly	but	for	the	moment	I	want	to	focus	on	the	nature	of	these	fundamental	distributional	properties.	Thus,	according	to	Paul,	instead	of	thinking	of	properties	as	that	which	need	to	be	‘occasioned’	by	substance,	we	can	take	them,	understood	n-adically	to	include	relations,	as	our	fundamental	‘building	blocks’	and	construct	the	‘structure	of	Reality’	on	that	basis	via	an	operation	of	‘fusion’.	She	takes	the	latter	from	what	she	calls	the	‘traditional	spatiotemporal	view’	of	world	building:		‘On	this	view,	the	material	world	is	a	kind	of	glued-together	jigsaw	puzzle	constructed	using	spatiotemporal	composition	as	the	glue.	The	effect	of	this	method	of	building	is	that	properties	of	larger	spatiotemporal	regions	are	built	by	spatiotemporally	fusing	together	smaller,	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	regions.	In	other	words,	on	the	spatiotemporal	view,	properties	of	larger	regions	are	constructed	via	the	spatiotemporal	fusion	of	their	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	parts,	so	the	qualitative	character	of	a	larger	spatiotemporal	region	supervenes	on	the	spatio-	temporal	fusion	of	its	smaller	spatiotemporal	parts.’	(Paul	2012,	p.	227).		Thus,	‘the	compositional	structure	of	the	material	world	derives	from	the	fusion	of	spatiotemporal	parts’	(ibid.,	p.	229).	Here	Paul	rejects	the	emphasis	on	spatio-temporality	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	incompatible	with	the	foregrounding	of	configuration	space	in	certain	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics.	Leaving	to	one	side	the	concern	that	this	may	not	seem	such	a	powerful	motivation	to	some,	Paul	advocates	an	alternative	‘mereological	bundle	theory’,	according	to	which,		‘The	overall	structure	of	the	world	is	created	by	the	fusion	of	fundamental	properties,	not	by	fusions	of	fundamental	localized	particles	or	their	equivalents,	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	regions,	leaving	room	for	the	likely	possibility	that	some	of	the	fundamental	properties	fused	to	make	the	world	are	holistic	properties	effectively	distributed	across	a	region.’	(ibid.,	p.	244)		Particles	can	then	be	reconceptualised	as	‘fusions’	of	n-adic	properties	in	a	move	that,	again,	resonates	with	the	core	of	OSR.	Indeed,	Paul	herself	notes	that	the	kinds	of	qualitative	entities,	such	as	relations,	that	she	is	concerned	with	‘…	can	serve	as	structural	‘nodes’	and	can	be	arranged	into	the	appropriate	patterns’	(2013,	p.	110)	and	that	her	view	‘…	may	also	complement	an	even	more	radical	sort	of	structuralism,	the	ontic	structuralism	of	Ladyman	(1998)	and	French	and	Ladyman	(2003)	’	(ibid.).	From	this	perspective,	the	claim	that	‘there	are	no	objects’	amounts	to	saying	that	‘we	collapse	the	difference	between	object,	property	and	substance’	so	that	‘collections	or	fusions	of	purely	qualitative	entities	can	perfectly	well	serve	as	non-relational	nodes	for	a	relational	structure	that	fits	the	empirical	constraints	of	the	ontic	structuralist.’	(ibid.,	pp.	110-111).4		
	 Such	a	metaphysical	underpinning	for	OSR	then	offers	the	possibility	of	a	response	to	the	question,	raised	by	some	commentators	recently:	what	instantiates	the	structure	(Dorato	2016)?	Or	as	Psillos	puts	it,	differently	but	relatedly:	without	objects	to	instantiate	the	properties,	how	could	laws,	as	universals,	yield	any	regularities	and	hence	have	any	‘concrete	and	worldly	content’	(Psillos	2016)?	Such	questions	presuppose	the	existence	of	a	metaphysical	gap	between	properties	and	laws	and	the	regularities	of	the	world,	or	more	generally	between	structure	and	‘the’	world,	whereby	this	gap	is	supposedly	only	closed	by	this	mysterious	relation	of	instantiation.	The	response	bluntly	consists	in	denying	the	existence	of	the	gap	to	begin	with	(see	French	2016)	and	Paul’s	account	offers	an	appropriate	justificatory	framework	for	such	a	denial.			 Given	that,	the	ontic	structural	realist	might	appeal	to	Paul’s	notion	of	‘fusion’	as	an	appropriate	device	taken	from	the	toolbox	of	metaphysics	and	deployed	to	help	answer	our	original	question,	what	is	structure:	structure	is	ultimately	a	fusion	of	n-adic	properties,	constructed	from	the	bottom	up,	as	it	were.			 Nevertheless,	further	concerns	may	arise,	centred	now	around	the	nature	of	this	device	and	whether	it	is	sufficiently	naturalistic.	How	are	we	to	understand	‘fusion’?	We	could	dismiss	the	question	and	insist	that	fusion	is	primitive	but	then	we’d	be	in	no	better	a	position	than	if	we	had	taken	the	‘occasioning’	of	properties	to	be	likewise.	Instead	we	might	approach	our	new	question	from	two	directions:	how	are	we	to	understand	fusion	metaphysically?	And	how	are	we	to	understand	it	physically?	The	former	encourages	us	to	consider	how	the	notion	can	be	related	to	other,	similar	metaphysical	concepts,	the	most	obvious	being	composition,	whereas	in	answering	the	latter	we	might	consider	what	physical	analogues	it	can	be	effectively	‘hung	on’.	As	we’ll	now	see,	these	two	possible	ways	of	understanding	the	notion	are	intertwined.		 Fortunately,	Paul	herself	sets	out	an	answer	to	the	first	question	above.	In	the	appendix	to	her	(2012)	she	emphasises	that	she	adopts	a	mereological	perspective	with	composition	as	the	‘basic	building	relation’	(ibid.,	p.	250)	with	the	basic	notion	of	‘proper	part’	understood	as	primitive	and	proper	parthood	taken,	as	is	standard,	as	irreflexive,	asymmetric	and	transitive.	Of	course,	the	‘parts’	here	are	qualitative	so	what	we	have	is	qualitative	composition,	or	fusion,	facilitated	by	a	principle	of	supplementation	(plus,	as	she	says,	uncontroversial	presuppositions	about	identity	and	existence),	that	states	that	if	something	has	a	proper	qualitative	part,	then	it	has	at	least	one	other	proper	qualitative	part	(ibid.,	p.	251).	As	Paul	notes,	there	is	no	explicit	tying	of	this	qualitative	composition	or	fusion	to	spatio-temporal	occupation	and	she	rejects	a	general	qualitative	fusion	axiom,	thereby	taking	the	composition	to	be	restricted.			 This	compositional	framework	can	then	accommodate	two	more	specific	models	that	represent	the	world	as	constructed	from	the	fusion	of	properties.	The	first	incorporates	two	composition	relations,	one	for	the	qualitative	parts,	that	is,	the	properties,	and	the	other	for	spatiotemporal	parts.	This	starts	with	the	properties	qualitatively	fused	together	with	spatio-temporal	locations	‘…to	create	a	mosaic-like	lowest	compositional	level	of	located,	unextended	qualitative	fusions	distributed	through	a	network	of	spatiotemporal	relations.’	(2012	p.	252)	These	unextended	fusions	are	then	composed	via	a	different	principle	to	yield	extended	entities,	along	standard	mereological	lines.		
	 However,	the	worry	with	this	proposal	is	that	quantum	physics	seems	to	present	us	with	examples	that	cannot	be	accommodated	by	this	‘mosaic’	model	–	photons	in	a	laser	beam,	for	example,	where	one	has	to	face	the	difficulty	of	defining	localised	states	for	the	particles	(see	Ceravolo	and	French	forthcoming).	Paul	herself	gestures	toward	an	alternative	‘global’	model,	according	to	which	‘…the	extended	world	is	wholly	and	immediately	constructed	from	a	fusion	of	n-adic	properties,	including	spatiotemporal	relations	and	perhaps	a	structuring	lawlike	relation,	resulting	in	a	distribution	of	properties	across	a	spatiotemporal	manifold’	and	spatio-temporal	parts	are	no	more	than	a	convenient	fiction	(Paul	2012,	pp.	254).	This,	she	claims,	can	accommodate	certain	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	such	as	wave	function	realism	and	the	Everett	interpretation	but	its	not	clear	how	it	can	accommodate	the	photon	example,	or	the	issues	to	do	with	identity	associated	by	both	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	more	generally.	One	might	speculate,	following	Ladyman	and	Ross	(2007,	p.	21)	that	different	sui	generis	compositional	models	are	needed	for	different	quantum	systems	(again	see	Ceravolo	and	French	forthcoming)	but	without	specific	details	it	is	difficult	to	say	more	within	the	context	of	Paul’s	framework.	What	is	needed	is	the	identification	of	some	physical	analogue	to	‘fusion’	that	would	render	the	relevant	metaphysics	more	naturalistic;	or	in	other	words,	the	metaphysics	still	needs	to	be	applied	to	the	physics.			 This	point	is	further	highlighted	when	we	consider	the	issue	of	the	‘concurrence’	of	predicates	that,	for	Williams,	as	we	saw	in	the	quote	above,	is	
concreteness;	in	other	words,	it	is	via	this	concurrence	that	the	structure	can	be	said	to	have	concrete	and	worldly	content.	The	further	question	is,	how	do	we	account	for	that	concurrence,	or,	putting	it	slightly	differently,	for	the	fact	that	only	certain	properties	are	found	together	giving	us	the	kinds	of	entities	that	we	observe,	from	bosons	and	fermions,	to	photons	and	protons	etc?	There	is	nothing	in	Paul’s	fusion	based	account	that	seems	to	offer	any	such	metaphysical	explanation.	Chakravartty,	for	example,	does	at	least	explicitly	address	this	issue	by	appealing	to	a	further	notion	of	‘sociability’,	taken	as	a	‘brute	fact’	(2007,	p.	171).			Again,	however,	the	very	bruteness	of	this	notion	raises	concerns	–	basically	this	also	seems	to	be	a	piece	of	free	floating	metaphysics	that	is	introduced	solely	as	a	metaphysical	explanans	and	that	doesn't	appear	to	be	tied	to	any	physical	principle	(French	2013;	for	a	response	see	Chakravartty	2013).	At	the	very	least,	one	can	argue	that	if	an	account	can	be	found	that	doesn’t	involve	such	brutality,	insofar	as	the	relevant	metaphysical	notion	can	be	attached	to	some	appropriate	analogue,	such	an	account	is	to	be	preferred.					
3.2	Tool2:	determinability	As	noted	above,	Paul’s	approach	may	be	seen	as	‘bottom-up’	in	the	sense	that	properties	as	basic	building	blocs	are	fused	to	yield	structure.	The	alternative	account	may	be	characterised	as	top-down	insofar	as	the	properties	can	be	said	to	‘drop	out’	of	the	structure,	characterised,	as	noted	previously,	by	laws	and	symmetries	(French	2014).	Here	again,	it	is	claimed,	we	have	a	one-category	ontology	and	the	structure	is	made	concrete	via	the	‘concurrence’	of	properties,	where	the	physical	analogue	of	the	latter	is	given	by	the	connection	between	the	relevant	properties,	such	as	charge,	mass	and	spin,	that	characterize	particle	kinds	and	the	irreducible	Hilbert	space	representation	of	the	(restricted)	Poincaré	group	(the	10-dimensional	non-compact	Lie	group	of	isometries	of	
Minkowski	spacetime).	Likewise,	as	we’ve	seen,	we	can	understand	the	distinction	in	statistical	behaviour	that	we	label	‘bosonic’	and	‘fermionic’	in	terms	of	the	symmetric	and	anti-symmetric	representations	of	the	permutation	group,	respectively.	From	this	perspective,	‘sociability’	is	just	the	metaphysical	counterpart	of	the	above	physical	connection.	Nevertheless,	there	is	further	metaphysical	work	to	be	done.	Just	as	one	might	wonder	what	is	involved	in	‘fusing’	properties,	so	one	might	ask	for	further	details	on	the	nature	of	this	‘dropping	out’	–	the	difference	being	that	in	the	former	case	we	lacked	a	physical	analogue,	whereas	in	the	latter	we	don’t	have	an	appropriate	metaphysics.			 As	mentioned	above,	in	(French	2014)	it	was	suggested	that,	as	far	as	those	features	to	do	with	symmetries	are	concerned,	the	structure-property	relationship	can	be	captured	by	that	between	determinables	and	determinates	(for	an	overview,	see	Wilson	2017).5		Our	question	now	is:	can	we	say	more	about	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	itself	(or	at	least,	more	than	is	given	in	French	2014)?		 It	turns	out	that	we	can.	Denby	(2001)	offers	an	interesting	formal	schema	that	the	structural	realist	can	appropriate	as	a	further	metaphysical	tool	to	help	explicate	the	relationship	between	structure	and	properties.	It	may	not	seem	that	this	appropriation	is	appropriate,	given	the	object-oriented	nature	of	Denby’s	device,	but	the	structural	realist	has	the	means	to	‘re-tool’	it	to	her	purposes,	as	we’ll	see.		 The	core	idea	is	to	think	of	a	determinable	as	a	‘classification’	of	particulars	(and	here	we	might	immediately	think	of	the	Wignerian	programme	that	underpins	the	above	relationship	between	symmetry	and	kinds),	whereby			D	is	a	determinable	iff	D	is	a	pair	(S,	f)	where:		(i)	S	is	a	metric	space;	and		(ii)	f	is	a	function	from	concrete	particulars	into	the	points	of	this	metric	space		S	defines	the	possible	classificatory	locations	and	how	they	are	related	and	the	points	of	this	space	represent	the	determinates.	The	function	f	defines	which	particulars	go	where	on	the	classification,	or	in	other	words,	it	determines	their	extension.	d	is	then	a	determinatea	iff	d	is	a	pair	(D,	Ei)	where	:		(i)	D	is	a	determinable;	and		(ii)	Ei	is	the	extension	of	point	i	in	the	metric	space	encoded	by	D.			This	captures	the	idea	that	the	identity	of	any	determinate	is	bound	up	with	its	determinable	so	that	each	determinate	can	be	said	to	belong	to	its	determinable.	Furthermore,	no	particular	manifests	(to	use	a	more	neutral	term	than	‘instantiates’)	more	than	one	determinate	belonging	to	a	given	determinable;	if	a	particular	manifests	some	determinate,	it	also	falls	under	its	determinable;	and	if	a	particular	falls	under	a	determinable,	it	manifests	some	determinate	or	other	of	that	determinable.	However,	this	schema	entails	no	constraints	on	the	manifestation	of	determinates	belonging	to	distinct	determinables,	or	on	which	determinate	of	a	given	determinable	a	particular	falling	under	it	must	manifest.		 Significantly,	it	encodes	a	general	metaphysical	picture	of	properties	that	elevates	the	distinction	between	determinables	and	their	determinates	from	what	might	be	viewed	as	a	local	curiosity	to	a	central	feature	of	the	nature	of	
properties	generally	(ibid.)	which	obviously	meshes	nicely	with	the	structuralist	view	of	the	relationship	between	symmetries	and	properties.	Furthermore,	and	crucially,	it	reverses	the	traditional	order	of	ontological	priority	between	determinables	and	determinates.	Determinables	have	typically	been	thought	of	as	Boolean	compounds	of	determinates.	However,	according	to	Danby’s	account,	a	determinate	has	an	entire	determinable	as	a	constituent	and	a	determinable	typically	has	more	structure	than	can	be	recovered	by	Boolean	operations	on	determinates,	where	this	structure	is	represented	by	its	metric	space's	distance	relation.	This	offers	a	way	of	formally	encoding	the	modal	nature	of	a	determinable,	such	as	PI	for	example,	which,	as	we’ve	noted,	incorporates	further	possible	kinds	beyond	those	of	bosons	and	fermions.	In	addition,	Danby’s	account	treats	the	characteristic	features	of	a	determinate,	including	its	relations	to	other	properties	and	the	degree	of	similarity	it	confers	on	its	instances	-	as	deriving	wholly	from	features	of	the	associated	determinable	(which,	as	just	noted,	is	understood	as	constituent).	Finally,	if	one	feels	inclined	to	view	things	in	Lewisian	terms,	it	reverses	tradition	by	taking	the	primary	bearer	of	‘naturalness’	–	granted,	a	problematic	notion	at	the	best	of	times	-	to	be	the	determinable	rather	than	the	determinate.		 Here	again,	then,	we	have	a	metaphysical	tool	that	we	can	deploy	to	help	sharpen	up	and	clarify	the	claim	that	fundamental	properties	like	being	a	boson/fermion,	mass,	charge	and	spin	etc.	‘drop	out’	of	the	relevant	symmetry:	the	relationship,	characterised	by	this	‘dropping	out’,	can	be	captured	in	terms	of	that	which	holds	between	a	determinable	and	its	determinate	and	Danby’s	account	offers	a	useful	formal	framework	in	terms	of	which	that	relationship	can	be	understood.			 There	is	an	immediate	worry	however:	as	we’ve	seen,	at	the	core	of	Danby’s	account	is	the	idea	of	regarding	a	determinable	as	a	‘classification’	of	particulars	within	a	broadly	set-theoretic	framework	but	that	seems	to	go	completely	against	the	grain	of	a	structuralist	stance.	My	response	is	to	appeal	to	what	I	have	called	elsewhere	‘the	Poincaré	manoeuvre’	(French	2014	pp.	66-68):	this	effectively	denies	the	ontological	significance	of	any	such	invocation	of	particulars,	or	objects	more	generally,	by	taking	them	to	be	merely	heuristic	devices	that	enable	us	to	present	in	mathematical	terms	the	structure	that	we	take	to	have	ontological	priority.	Its	a	move	that	has	been	appealed	to	time	and	again	throughout	the	history	of	structuralism,	beginning	with	Poincaré	(hence	the	name)	who	noted	how	we	may	begin	our	reflections	in	geometry	by	thinking	about	certain	figures,	which	then	leads	us	to	consider	the	possible	transformations	those	figures	may	undergo,	which	transformations	may	then	be	codified	via	group	theory	…	at	which	point	we	may	focus	on	these	alone	and	throw	away	the	figures	we	started	with	as	mere	‘heuristic	crutches’,	useful	only	to	get	us	to	this	group	theoretic	destination.6			 So,	generalising	this	manoeuvre,	those	of	us	who	write	sinistrodextrally	may	set	down	set-theoretic	structure	from	left	to	right	in	the	form	<A,	R>,	where	
A	is	a	set	of	elements	and	R	a	family	of	relations,	but	following	the	Poincaré	manoeuvre	we	can	read	and	ontologically	interpret	it	dextrosinistrally.	Likewise,	in	the	case	of	determinability,	the	structuralist	can	still	avail	herself	of	the	tool	supplied	by	Danby’s	account	by	performing	the	manoeuvre	and	reconceiving	the	‘concrete	particulars’	in	terms	of	determinable-determinate	structure.	Thus	she	can	begin	by	classifying	the	pututative	‘particulars’	–	that	is,	elementary	
‘systems’	in	Wignerian	terms	–	in	terms	of	symmetry	groups,	then	metaphysically	reconceptualise	the	former	via	group	theory,	taking	the	symmetries,	understood	as	determinables,	as	that	which	has	ontological	priority	(for	more	on	the	Poincaré	manoeuvre,	see	Wolff	2019	and,	in	response,	French	2019).			 Relatedly,	Danby	presents	his	account	in	a	nominalistic	context,	invoking	no	primitive	modal	notions	and	effectively	outsourcing	the	modality	associated	with	determinables	to	the	relevant	counterparts	in	certain	possible	worlds.	The	structuralist	could	follow	this	Lewisian	track	and	take,	for	example,	the	non-standard	statistical	possibilities	encoded	in	PI	as	manifested	in	other	possible	worlds	(for	Humean	forms	of	structural	realism,	see	Lyre	2010).	Alternatively,	she	can	run	the	Poincaré	manoeuvre	once	again	and	allow	modality	to	re-enter	the	actual	world,	thereby	making	good	on	the	claim	that	‘…	ontic	structural	realism	is	in	part	a	commitment	to	objective	modal	structure	in	the	concrete	world	…’	(Ladyman	2019).	Doing	so,	however,	raises	a	further	set	of	metaphysical	issues	having	to	do	with	how	we	regard	modality.		
4.	Modality	The	debate	over	modality	is	often	portrayed	as	one	that	holds	between	two	opposing	positions:	that	of	the	dispositionalist,	who	takes	the	modality	inherent	in	natural	laws,	say,	as	ultimately	deriving	from	the	dispositions,	capacities,	or,	more	generally,	powers	of	the	relevant	particulars;	and	the	Humean	who,	as	touched	on	above,	rejects	any	such	ascription	of	modality	to	laws	and	accounts	for	our	modal	‘talk’	in	terms	of	possible	worlds	or	somesuch	device.	Within	this	context	there	are,	again,	various	tools	available	to	the	structuralist.			 Obviously	she	should	not	follow	the	standard	dispositionalist	line,	with	its	emphasis	on	particulars,	but	she	could,	for	example,	understand	modality	in	terms	of	a	disposition	of	the	world-as-a-whole	(see	Chakravartty	2019).	The	idea,	then,	would	be	that	the	world	is	disposed	to	yield,	in	some	sense,	various	features	characterised	in	terms	of	Permutation	Invariance,	Poincaré	symmetry	and	so	forth.	However,	such	a	shift	in	focus	is	not	straightforward,	metaphysically	speaking.	Standardly,	dispositionalism	is	cashed	out	in	terms	of	the	Stimulus	and	Manifestation	Condition	and	the	Dispositional	Identity	Thesis.	The	former	allows	us	to	grasp	the	nature	of	a	disposition	in	terms	of	the	manifestation	of	a	particular	effect	in	response	to	a	given	stimulus;	so,	for	example,	when	a	test	charge	is	brought	up	to	a	fixed	charge	–	stimulus	–	a	force	(and	consequent	acceleration)	results	–	the	manifestation.	The	latter	metaphysically	ties	the	disposition	to	the	relevant	property	insofar	as	the	property	is	(metaphysically)	identified	in	terms	of	the	dispositions,	or	powers;	thus	charge,	for	example,	is	identified	in	terms	of	its	disposition	to	manifest	a	force	when	a	test	charge,	say,	is	brought	up	to	it.		 However,	there	is	an	obvious	concern	with	nailing	down	the	relevant	stimuli	when	it's	the	world-as-a-whole	that	is	disposed	to	yield	a	certain	manifestation.	Perhaps	that	can	be	accommodated	by	recent	moves	towards	stimuli-less	accounts	(Mumford	2011)	but	other	problems	remain.	In	the	context	of	the	Dispositional	Identity	Thesis	it	is	not	clear	what	the	relevant	property	would	be	that	would	be	identified	with	the	appropriate	dispositions	(see	French	2019,	2020).	One	option	would	be	to	take	that	property	as	‘being	the	world’.		In	that	case,	we	would	have	one	property	associated	with	myriad	different	
dispositions,	corresponding	to	the	different	symmetries.	Perhaps,	instead,	one	could	associate	the	relevant	properties	of	‘the	world’	with	the	appropriate	laws.	But	then	the	world-as-a-whole,	understood	as	a	particular,	seems	metaphysically	otiose	as	it	is	the	laws	that	would	be	the	actual	seats	of	the	relevant	dispositions.			 Thus,	it	would	seem	that,	regarded	as	metaphysical	tools,	both	the	standard	dispositional	account	and	the	above	shifted	version	are	not	fit	for	structuralist	purposes.	Nevertheless,	there	are	other	devices	in	the	toolbox	that	could	be	appropriated.		 There	is,	for	example,	a	long	history	of	understanding	modality	‘in	the	world’,	as	it	were,	in	terms	of	potentiality.	Vetter	has	recently	taken	this	further	and	elaborated	the	notion	through	a	formal	framework	that	analyses	it	in	terms	of	predicate	logic	with	identity	together	with	the	predicate	operator	POT	(Vetter	2015).	Within	such	a	framework,	the	claim	that	‘It	is	possible	that	P’	is	defined	as:	‘Something	has	an	iterated	potentiality	for	it	to	be	the	case	that	P’	(ibid.,	p.	197).	Since	potentiality	comes	in	degrees,	Vetter	characterises	it	in	terms	of	the	determinable-determinate	relationship,	again,	whereby	the	specific	degrees	to	which	a	particular	determinable	can	be	possessed	are	its	determinates;	so	a	concrete	block	is	less	breakable	than	that	standard	philosophical	example,	a	porcelain	vase,	the	two	objects	possessing	different	determinates	of	the	determinable	‘breakability’. 	 We	can	see	how	this	plays	out	in	the	case	of	laws.	Previously	Vetter	identified	a	metaphysical	gap	between	the	dispositions	possessed	by	particular	objects	and	the	laws	that	are	typically	claimed	to	supervene	on	the	latter.	Standardly,	the	Stimulus	and	Manifestation	Condition	is	invoked	in	order	to	obtain	the	relevant	law	from	the	particular	dispositions;	so,	the	idea	is	that	Coulomb’s	Law	can	be	obtained	from	a	metaphysical	consideration	of	repeated	iterations	of	a	test	charge	being	used	to	stimulate	the	appropriate	manifestation	from	a	given	charge	(Bird	2007).	However,	as	Vetter	noted,	all	that	we	obtain	in	such	cases	is	the	conjunction	‘charge	x	experiences	a	force	f1	when	brought	to	a	distance	r1	from	charge	y’	&	‘charge	x	experiences	a	force	f2	when	brought	to	a	distance	r2	from	charge	y’	&	…	so	on.	There	is,	in	effect,	a	gap	between	such	a	conjunction	and	the	law	statement	itself	(Vetter	2009).			 According	to	her	potentiality	account,	we	should	view	such	situations	quite	differently:	objects	that	have	charge	have	a	certain	potentiality	to	exert	a	force	in	accordance	with	Coulomb’s	Law	and	they	have	this	potentiality	to	a	maximum	degree;	thus	electric	charge	is	identified	as	the	maximal	potentiality	to	exert	a	force.	In	effect,	then,	Vetter’s	account	identifies	the	nomological	disposition	with	the	determinate	of	potentiality	(understood	as	a	determinable).	And	on	this	basis	she	claims	to	derive	Coulomb’s	Law	(Vetter	2015	p.	286).		 However,	there	is	still	a	gap:	Coulomb’s	Law	can	be	understood	as	metaphysically	necessary	only	if	the	identification	of	charge	with	maximal	potentiality	is	necessary.	But	why	should	we	accept	this?	Here	we	have	a	gap	in	explaining	the	status	of	the	metaphysical	necessity	of	Coulomb’s	Law.		 One	option	is	to	adopt	a	‘shallow’	view	of	laws	à	la	Hume	or	Lewis	(again	we	might	refer	back	to	our	discussion	of	Paul’s	view	here).	Thus	Vetter	suggests	that	we	add	potentialities	to	the	‘natural	properties’	that	underpin	the	regularities	in	the	Humean	‘mosaic’	(ibid.,	p.	289).	Leaving	aside	the	point	that	such	a	suggestion	would	send	both	Hume	and	Lewis	spinning	in	their	respective	graves,	it	effectively	introduces	further	metaphysics	in	order	to	bridge	a	gap	that	
was	created	by	adopting	a	certain	metaphysical	stance	in	the	first	place:	namely	one	that	is	oriented	towards	an	ontology	of	particulars.		
 If	we	drop	this	stance	and	instead	of	pursuing	what	is	in	effect	a	‘bottom	up’	approach,	take	things	from	the	top	down,	then	an	alternative	option	emerges:	we	deny	the	existence	of	any	metaphysical	gap	in	the	first	place	by	ascribing	the	relevant	potentialities	directly	to	the	laws	and	symmetries	that	(partly)	constitute	the	structure	of	the	world	(French	2018).	Appropriating	Vetter’s	account	as	a	tool	would	then	offer	one	way	of	metaphysically	characterising	the	sense	in	which	the	world-as-structure	is	inherently	modal.	Take	our	old	friend	PI	one	more	time	and	the	way	it	encompasses	more	possibilities	than	the	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	that	we	observe	in	this	the	actual	world:	there	is	the	potential	–	fleetingly	realised	in	the	1960s	in	the	case	of	quarks	–	for	non-standard	statistics	to	be	manifested.		 Now,	there	may	appear	to	be	a	problem	here,	which	can	be	seen	if	we	compare	this	structuralist	view	with	that	of	Sider	(2011).	On	Sider’s	account	the	fundamental	structure	is	given	by	first-order	quantification	theory,	set	theory	plus	fundamental	physics	and	Vetter	comments	that	‘[i]f	the	fundamental	physics	is	part	of	the	structure	of	the	world,	then	the	world	has	no	potentialities	to	have	a	different	physical	outlook.’	(2015,	p.	260).	However,	this	is,	again,	to	take	a	bottom-up	and	particular-oriented	stance.	If,	for	example,	we	take	our	‘fundamental	physics’	to	embrace	symmetry	principles	(as	determinables)	then	we	arrive	at	an	entirely	different	destination,	where	the	potentiality	to	‘have	a	different	physical	outlook’	is	encoded	(mathematically)	in	the	relevant	structure	(not	forgetting	the	role	of	the	relevant	‘existential	witnesses’).7				 Referring	back	to	the	debate	over	the	metaphysics	of	laws,	the	structuralist	offers	a	perspective	that	can	perhaps	be	described	as	a	‘third	way’	between	both	the	Humean	and	the	dispositionalist.	Insofar	as	the	former	identifies	laws,	understood	as	represented	by	the	relevant	axioms	in	some	‘best	system’,	with	regularities	in	the	mosaic,	laws	are	‘in’	the	world,	albeit	stripped	of	any	modality	on	this	account.	Insofar	as	the	latter	reduces	that	modality	to	that	of	the	underlying	dispositions	or	powers,	the	laws	themselves	may	be	eliminated	(Mumford	2004)	and	hence	cannot	be	taken	to	be	‘in’	the	world.	According	to	the	structuralist,	however,	the	laws	are	both	modally	informed	and	‘in’	the	world	–	indeed,	they	are,	in	part,	the	world!8			 Furthermore,	such	a	perspective	offers	a	different	view	of	the	contentious	issue	of	the	supposed	governing	role	of	laws.	As	already	touched	on	above,	such	a	role	presupposes	a	metaphysical	‘gap’	between	the	laws	and	the	phenomena	they	are	supposed	to	govern.	Humeans,	of	course,	do	not	see	any	such	gap	and	thus	deny	such	a	role	but	then	they	must	face	the	problem	of	the	‘explanatory	circle’:	how	can	laws	explain	the	phenomena	if,	on	the	Humean	account,	they	are,	ultimately,	identified	with	the	phenomena	(see,	for	example,	Dorst	2019)?	Dispositionalists,	on	the	other	hand	typically	accept	such	a	governing	role	but	as	Mumford	has	argued,	if	the	laws	‘flow	from’	or	supervene	on	the	underlying	powers	or	dispositions	of	the	relevant	particulars	(something	that	Vetter	disputes	as	we	have	seen),	then	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	they	can	be	said	to	govern	the	behaviour	of	the	latter.	On	the	structuralist	view,	just	as	in	Paul’s	approach,	there	is	no	metaphysical	gap	in	the	above	sense,	nor	is	there	any	governing	role	for	laws,	or	symmetries	to	play,	again	in	the	above	sense.	Nevertheless,	we	can	still	understand	their	explanatory	function	by,	for	example,	
appealing	to	the	Woodwardian	framework.	Once	again,	consider	PI:	we	can	explain	its	role	in	explaining	phenomena	such	as	that	of	the	halting	of	the	collapse	of	white	dwarf	stars	(French	and	Saatsi	2018)	by	appealing	to	the	potential	alternative	representations	encoded	within	the	principle.	Note,	however,	in	denying	the	above	metaphysical	gap,	this	does	not	negate	the	need	for	some	account	of	the	relationship	between	such	symmetries	and	laws	and	specific	measurement	outcomes,	but	that	would	involve,	as	we	have	seen,	some	choice	of	an	interpretation	of	quantum	theory.		 Returning,	finally,	to	our	twin	motivations,	a	further	worry	arises,	to	the	effect	that	this	appeal	to	‘existential	witnesses’	in	pinning	down	the	possible	structures	to	one	that	is	fit	for	purpose	in	the	context	of	modern	physics,	generates	a	form	of	context-dependence	that	undermines	the	other	motivation	regarding	structure	retention	through	theory	change.	The	core	of	this	concern	consists	in	the	claim	that	modal	relations	that	are	relative	to	an	epistemic	context	cannot	be	regarded	as	fundamental	‘in	a	world’	where	that	context	holds	(see	Ruyant,	forthcoming).	Since	the	modal	relations	sketched	above	in	terms	of	PI	are	indeed	relative	to	the	particular	epistemic	context	in	which	we	find	ourselves	they	cannot	be	regarded	as	fundamental,	or	so	the	argument	goes.			 The	example	given	is	that	of	early	theories	of	light	that	only	hold	in	the	absence	of	magnetic	fields.	If	we	take	it	as	necessary	that,	in	the	context	where	there	are	no	magnetic	fields,	the	angle	of	reflection	of	alight	beam	is	equal	to	the	angle	of	incidence,	it	does	not	follow	that	in	that	context,	it	is	necessary	that	the	angle	of	reflection	of	alight	beam	is	equal	to	the	angle	of	incidence.	That	would	only	be	the	case	if	the	context	were	necessary	but	‘[t]he	fact	that	there	is	no	magnetic	field	at	some	place	in	the	universe	is	not	necessary	but	contingent.	’	(ibid.,	p.	9).	That	is	seen	to	be	problematic	for	the	structural	realist	insofar	as	the	relevant	law	of	angles	cannot	be	taken	to	correspond	to	the	fundamental	modal	structure	of	the	world	but	only	to	the	structure	given	that	particular	context;	that	is,	it	is	relative	to	that	context.			 An	obvious	move	would	be	to	say	that	the	given	modal	statement	approximates	the	relevant	necessary	law	but	then	it	is	unclear	how	to	measure	the	extent	of	such	approximation	(ibid.).	Consider	another	example,	that	of	Galileo’s	law	of	free	fall	which	can	be	taken	as	retained	in	contemporary	theories	in	the	sense	given	by	Post’s	Correspondence	Principle	(1971).	Yet	the	range	of	contexts	in	which	it	does	so	is,	of	course,	tiny	and	the	law	is	highly	contingent,	to	the	extent	that	it	seems	implausible	to	claim	that	it	in	any	way	approximates	the	supposedly	necessary	laws	of	General	Relativity	(Ruyant	forthcoming).	Alternatively	one	might	emphasise	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	laws	that	the	structural	realist	is	focussing	on	but,	it	is	argued,	the	analysis	can	be	applied	‘quite	straightforwardly’:	a	modal	relation	that	states	that	it	is	necessary	that	R,	say,	cannot	count	as	fundamental	in	a	world	where	it	is	the	case	that	‘it	is	necessary	that	in	context	C,	R	holds’	(ibid.,	p.	13).		 Of	course,	such	judgments	of	context	dependence	and	hence	modal	relativity	are	all	made	in	retrospect.	At	the	time	at	which	he	supposedly	proposed	his	law,	Galileo	was	not	aware	of	its	highly	limited	range	of	applicability.	Thus	the	above	concern	might	be	folded	into	the	attitude	of	fallibility	which	all	realists	should	adopt:	from	our	current	epistemic	vantage	point	we	may	not	be	aware	of	the	extent	of	the	context	in	which	our	currently	held	laws	and	theories	hold.	And	of	course,	we	currently	take	to	be	fundamental	
those	laws	and	principles	that	we	(currently)	believe	to	hold	across	all	possible	contexts;	that	is,	we	identify	the	relevant	context	with	the	fundamental	level,	with	the	caveat,	of	course,	that	we	may	discover	that	this	level	is	not,	in	fact,	the	most	fundamental.			 Indeed,	take	the	Standard	Model,	undergirded	as	it	is	by	PI	and	other	symmetry	principles:	we	know,	or	at	least	strongly	suspect,	that	this	cannot	be	the	fundamental	‘theory	of	everything’,	not	least	because	quantum	field	theory,	on	which	it	is	built,	is	widely	regarded	as	‘merely’	an	effective	field	theory,	applicable	only	over	a	certain	energy	range,	and,	of	course,	it	does	not	incorporate	gravity.	So	we	can	accept	that	the	modal	force	of	PI	is	limited	to	this	particular	context	but	then	the	motivation	for	structural	realism	was	always	to	come	up	with	a	form	of	realism	appropriate	for	current	physics	–		the	context	dependence	was	always	there,	right	from	the	start.	And	of	course,	that	context	is	delineated,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	relevant	‘existential	witnesses’;	again,	our	world	is	a	bosonic	and	fermionic	world,	not	a	parastatistical	one.	But	for	modal	relations	to	be	‘in’	a	world	in	the	first	place	they	must	be	tied	to	that	world	via	certain	existential	witnesses	that	delineate	the	relevant	epistemic	context.	Far	from	undermining	structural	realism,	this	incorporation	of	determinates	as	a	feature	of	the	structure	à	la	Cassirer	yields	an	account	fit	to	represent	this,	the	actual,	world.				
5.	Conclusion	Finally,	let	us	return	to	our	original	question,	what	is	structure?	I	have	suggested	that	to	answer	this	question	we	need	to	deploy	certain	tools	appropriated	from	the	toolbox	of	metaphysics	and	as	in	the	case	of	objects,	alternative	options	are	available.	So,	for	example,	following	Paul,	we	could	take	structure	to	be	a	‘fusion’	of	properties	in	the	sense	outlined	above.	However,	although	I	am	sympathetic	to	her	attempt	to	construct	a	one-category	ontology,	fusion	as	a	tool	is	problematic	inasmuch	as	it	has	no	mathematico-physical	correlate.	That's	not	an	issue	with	the	other	‘tool’	that	I’ve	looked	at,	namely	the	determinable-determinate	relationship.	In	that	case,	rather	than	starting	with	the	metaphysics,	we	begin	with	this	idea	of	properties	‘dropping	out’	of	the	symmetries,	where	this	is	represented	mathematically	by	the	relationship	between	the	relevant	group	and	its	representations	and	can,	I	suggest	here,	be	captured	via	devices	such	as	Danby’s,	viewed	through	the	lens	of	the	Poincaré	manoeuvre	of	course.			 This	generates	the	further	worry	about	what,	exactly,	the	metaphysics	is	contributing	in	this	latter	case.	One	answer	is	that	it	contributes	to	our	understanding	by	playing	a	kind	of	umbrella	role	in	covering	both	‘everyday’	examples	and	the	more	arcane	situations	that	we	find	in	modern	physics	(Chakravartty	2013;	French	2018).	Thus	consider	again	the	further	tool	of	potentiality	taken	from	Vetter’s	work.	Her	account	is	heavily	focussed	on	the	language	of	possibility	that	we	use	in	everyday	life:	for	her,	adjectives	such	as	‘fragile’	express	the	relevant	sense	of	potentiality	at	this	level.	When	it	comes	to	physics,	the	language	is	different,	of	course,	and	it	is	the	mathematics	of	group	theory	that	acts	as	the	language	in	terms	of	which	the	relevant	symmetries	are	expressed.	As	in	the	case	of	our	everyday	talk,	we	can	take	this	as	revealing	or	encoding	the	relevant	possibilities	and	what	the	deployment	of	the	tool	of	potentiality	allows	us	to	do	is	to	conceive	of	this	encoding	in	terms	that	can	be	
related	to	other	forms	of	potentiality,	including	those	exhibited	by	fragile	vases	in	‘everyday’	life.	It	is	through	such	connections	that	we	may	then	achieve	a	measure	of	understanding	(French	2018;	for	a	response	see	Vetter	2018).		 In	conclusion	then,	there	is	a	range	of	devices	in	the	toolbox	we	can	use	to	make	further	sense	of	these	options.	The	trick	is	to	ensure	the	tool	is	‘fit	for	purpose’	when	it	comes	to	the	physics	but	even	if	it	isn’t,	it	can	sometimes	be	beaten	into	shape!				
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Philosophy	of	Science	63:	607-625.		Wolff,	J.	(2019),	‘Why	Eliminativism?’	Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science	74:	16-21.		Worrall,	J.	(1989),	‘Structural	realism:	The	Best	of	Both	Worlds?’	Dialectica	43:	99–124.																																																												*	Based	on	my	presentation	at	the	Structure	of	Reality	and	the	Reality	of	Structure	conference	in	Rotterdam,	June	2019.	Huge	thanks	to	Fred	Muller	for	organising	the	conference	and	to	Anjan	Chakravartty,	James	Ladyman,	Laura	Felline,	Kerry	McKenzie,	Fred	again,	Simon	Saunders,	David	Schroeren	and	others	for	comments	and	fruitful	discussions.	1	However,	he	subsequently	shifted	his	response	to	the	underdetermination,	from	an	‘eliminativist’	stance	towards	objects	to	one	that	allows	for	a	‘thin’	metaphysical	conception	of	them	(see	French	and	Ladyman	2011).	2	There	remains	the	concern	as	to	how	the	relevant	symmetry	is	broken	without	introducing	an	extraneous	element,	that	effectively	plays	the	same	role	as	the	classical	environment,	or	consciousness,	or	a	probability	‘field’;	that	is,	some	account	has	to	be	given	of	how	a	given	sub-structure	can	break	the	symmetry	associated	with	another.	As	Lombardi	acknowledges	(Lombardi	2019,	p.	47),	there	is	more	work	to	be	done	here,	perhaps	invoking	a	‘closed-system’	account	of	decoherence.	(I’m	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	and	Juha	Saatsi	for	discussions	on	this.)		3	And	it	still	is,	at	least	within	the	general	philosophy	of	science	community,	suggesting	there	is	further	proselytization	to	be	done!	4	Comparisons	can	also	be	drawn	with	Chakravartty’s	incorporation	of	a	version	of	bundle	theory	into	his	structurally	inclined	‘semi-realism’	(Chakravartty	2007;	cf.	also	Lombardi	2019	for	a	
																																																								quantum	mechanical	rendering)	and	also	with	Schaffer’s	monism,	insofar	as	we	might	conceive	of	the	‘world-bundle’	as	a	fusion	of	qualitative	properties	with	spatio-temporal	locations.	5	Echoing	Wilson,	Paul	acknowledges	that	determinables	might	be	among	the	fundamental	properties	and	relations.	6	Eddington	famously	deployed	a	similar	move	with	regard	to	the	rotation	group	in	quantum	mechanics	(see	French	2014,	p.	87).	7	There	is	more	to	say	about	the	comparison	between	Sider’s	structuralism	and	ontic	structural	realism	but	that	should	wait	for	another	opportunity	(but	see	lectures	4	and	5	in	Sider’s	John	Locke	Lectures:	https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/john-locke-lectures).	8	Crucially	what	the	Humean	and	the	dispositionalist	also	omit	or	cannot	accommodate	are	the	symmetries,	although	for	moves	in	the	right	direction	when	it	comes	to	the	former,	see	Daguid	forthcoming.		
